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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff alleged a willful failure on the part of 
Defendant "to comply with the law or any lawful order of the 
Industrial Commission" and therefore claimed entitlement to 
a 15% increase in his Workman's Compensation benefits as allowed 
by U. C. A., 1953, §35-1-12. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Administrative Law Judge denied the additional 
benefits as claimed. The Plaintiff timely filed a Motion For 
Review with the Industrial Commission. The Industrial Commission 
affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants respectfully ask that the decision denying 
the increased benefits be affirmed by this Court. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
FACTS 
i 
Plaintiff was totally and permanently incapacitated 
in a most tragic industrial accident which occurred on June 11, 
19 73. At that time he was employed by Defendant, Eaton Metal 
Products Company. The accident occurred when the boom of a crane 
which was under repair slipped from a metal support that had been 
placed under it and struck Plaintiff. His injuries resulted in 
paraplegia. Other pertinent facts will be brought out in the 
arguments that follow. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO FIFTEEN PERCENT INCREASE 
IN HIS COMPENSATION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PRESENTED SUFFI-
CIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF A WILLFUL FAILURE OF 
DEFENDANT TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW OR ANY LAWFUL ORDER OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
Plaintiff has claimed that Defendant was at the time 
of the accident and injury in issue in violation of U. C. A., 
1953, §35-1-12. For the convenience of the Court, that section 
is set forth below: 
No employer shall construct or occupy or main-
tain any place of employment that is not safe, or 
require or knowingly permit any employee to be in any 
employment or place of employment which is not safe, 
or fail to provide and use safety devices and safe-
guards , or fail to obey and follow orders of the 
commission or to adopt and use methods and processes 
reasonably adequate to render such employment and 
place of employment safe, and no employer shall fail 
or neglect to do every other thing reasonably necessary 
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to protect the life, health, safety and welfare 
of his employees. Where injury is caused by the 
willful failure of an employer to comply with the 
law or any lawful order of the industrial commis-
sion, compensation as provided for in this title 
shall be increased fifteen percent, except in 
case of injury resulting in death. (Emphasis added) 
The crux of a determination of a breach of the above 
statute requires first that there be a failure of the employer 
1) "to obey a law11,or 2) "any lawful order of the Industrial 
Commission", and 3) that failure must be "willful". 
Plaintiff makes no claim that Defendant failed to 
obey any lawful order of the Industrial Commission and the 
record is void of evidence of any such breach. 
Plaintiff does claim that there is evidence to support 
its claim that Defendant "willfully" failed to have a safety 
program in effect and presumably that said "willful" failure 
caused the unfortunate accident to Mr. Salas (See Applicant's 
brief at pages 3 and 4). 
The real basis of any claim for a 15% increase in 
benefits depends on a determination of what constitutes will-
fulness on the part of an employer. This Court long ago made 
that determination. In the cases of Western Clay & Metals 
Company v. Industrial Commission, 70 Utah 279, 259 Pac. 279 
(Utah 1927) and Utah Mining Company v. Industrial Commission, 
62 Utah 421, 220 Pac. 389 (Utah 1923)-. In both of those cases, 
the Industrial Commission made a determination that there had 
been a willful violation by the employer of general safety orders 
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enacted by the Commission. 
I n
 Park Utah, supra., the Court explained its decision 
in reversing the Industrial Commission in the following terms: 
"It should be stated that there is no evidence 
in the record that any notice had been given, or 
suggestion made, to the plaintiff mining company that 
the method employed by it was not satisfactory to 
the Commission, or that the Commission considered 
the method employed as less likely to accomplish the 
purpose for which the order had been issued. In fact, 
it is not shown that the mining company had any actual 
knowledge of the existence of this general order." 
(Emphasis added) (62 U. 421 at 424) 
Not only did Defendant employer herein not have notice 
of any order of the Commission, there is no evidence one existed. 
The Court went on to further define willfulness: 
"The authorities, however, are agreed that negligence 
alone, or even gross negligence, is not sufficeint to 
constitute "willful failure" or "serious"failure" to 
comply with the requirements of the statute or orders 
of the Commission. There is nothing in the findings 
or m the evidence before the Commission to indicate 
or suggest that the plaintiff mining company or its 
superintendent was acting in disregard of the safety of 
its employes, or to indicate a willingness on the part 
of the superintendent to inflict injury upon the employes." 
(Emphasis added) (62 U. 421 at 425) 
The Court amplified that definition in Western Clay 
Metals, supra., by citing with approval the standards for 
"willfulness" of several other jurisdictions: 
"
In
 Wick v. Gunn, 66 Okla. 316, 169 Pac. 1087, 4 
A.L.R. 10 7, the term "wilful failure," as used in the 
Workmenfs Compensation Act, as applied to the conduct 
of an employee, was held to mean, not merely voluntary 
and intentional, but to carry with it the idea of pre-
meditation, obstinacy, and intentional wrong doing." 
"In Bersch v. Morris & Co., 106 Kan. 800, 189 
P. 934, 9 A. L. R. 1374, the court said that the meaning 
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of the words "willful failure" is not necessarily fulfilled 
by voluntary and intentional omission, but includes the 
element of intractableness, the headstrong disposition 
to act by the rule of contradiction." 
"In Nashville, C. & St. L» Ry. Co. v. Wright, 147 
Tenn. 619, 250 S. W. 903, the words were interpreted to 
mean something more than negligence and carrying the idea 
of deliberation and intentional wrongdoing." (Emphasis added) 
A review of the record shows that the above criteria 
are most certainly not supported by the evidence produced by 
Plaintiff in the record. 
Mr. Steven Lee, Division Manager at Defendant, Eaton 
Metals, was aware that the boom which fell and struck Plaintiff 
had been propped up so the internals could be taken out for 
repair. (R. 66 & 70) The company conducted periodic safety meetings 
(R. 71). He felt in his own mind that the metal support under the 
boom was adequate and safe while the maintenance was being done 
and that it wasn't hazardous to anyone. (R. 72) He received 
no notice from anyone that a hazard existed there. (R. 73) 
Mr. Lee was also of the opinion that Plaintiff was a 
good worker who had had no problems with him or anyone else 
at Eaton. (R. 73-74) 
Elf ego Agui-lar was the next to testify. Mr. Aginlar 
is a good friend of the Plaintiff and is in fact married to 
Plaintiff's cousin. He saw the boom fall the Friday before the 
injury to Plaintiff when the brake drum broke down. The first 
time he saw the boom propped up by the pipe support was the 
morning of the accident the following Monday. (R. 86-88) 
There is no evidence that Mr. Agui-lar gave notice to anyone in 
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authority that the boom support was insufficient and hazardous. 
Bob Lemon was a welder at Eaton and sometime operator 
of the crane in question. He was also the Union Steward at 
Eaton (R. 91) He affirmed that the crane broke down while he 
was operating it the Friday before the accident and that it 
had fallen. (R. 9 4) He stated that on a few occasions before 
there had been problems of different sorts with that particular 
crane. (R. 96-99) He told his supervisor Dutch the preceeding 
Friday that the crane was unsafe in its present condition and 
Dutch said he would have it fixed. (R. 102) As promised by Dutch, 
maintenance was in the process -of correcting the problem with 
the crane when Plaintiff was injured. (R. 115) 
Each time there was a problem with the crane it was 
reported to maintenance and the problem was corrected. At the 
time of the accident the boom was propped up while they were 
waiting for parts. (R. 99) When Mr. Lemon went to work on 
the Monday morning of the accident he stated he felt the area 
was unsafe, but he took no action to notify or warn anyone. 
(R. 107, 120) 
Plaintiff*s witness Steven Carlson saw the boom sitting 
on the pipe for the first time, as did the others, on the morning 
of the accident. (R. 12 4) He never made any comments to his 
supervisor, Dutch, about any hazard he may have sensed. (R. 133) 
An accident inspection report of Sam Mulliner's made 
in his official capacity as a State Safety Inspector for the 
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Utah Occupational Safety and Health Division, was properly 
introduced into evidence by Defendant as an exception to the 
hearsay rule under the Utah Rules of Evidence Sections 6 3 (15), 
Reports and Findings of Public Officials; 6 3 (16), Filed Reports, 
Made by People Exclusively Authorized; and 64 (17) Content of 
Official Record. (R. 15 4-157) That report described the accident 
and stated there was no violation of a standard. 
"33. Describe accident - A crane boom being 
repaired was blocked up at one end with a 3" pipe 
support. The pipe support was on a 1" piece of steel 
plating. The victam (sic) and other workman were 
removing plate hook from steel plate under the boom. 
The support slipped when the plate was lifted with a 
pry bar. The boom fell, striking victam (sic). 
X X X 
35. Did a violation of a standard cause or con-
tribute to this accident* - Yes (SoJP (Emphasis added -
circle around "No" in original report) 
Additional evidence from Mr. Mulliner was introduced 
into evidence in the form of a letter dated October 20, 1974. 
(R. 16 4-66) Said letter was introduced over the objection of 
the Defendant on the ground that it was hearsay procured by 
Plaintiff's counsel by a letter apparently sent to Mr. Mulliner 
propounding questions not introduced into evidence. It was 
considered along with all of the other evidence by the Administra-
tive Law Judge in denying the Plaintiff's claim for increased 
benefits. In any event, all that Mr. Mulliner adds to the 
evidence is that supervision was lax and a safety program was 
-7-
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not in effect. (R. 164-166) Section 35-1-12, U. C. A. , 1953 
does not give any specifics for a safety program and does not 
in fact require a specific safety plan. Apparently, the statute 
leaves it to the Industrial Commission to promulgate such standards 
rules and regulations for a particular place of business and the 
industry as a whole in the state as in its discretion the 
Commission deems proper. No such safety plan appears in the 
record. 
Plaintiff makes a point in his brief at Page 3 that 
testimony of notice to the employer of an unsafe condition was 
wrongly excluded because it was hearsay. The issue really 
isn't the admissibility of the hearsay evidence. Instead, the 
issue is whether a finding of fact in favor of Plainiff can be 
based on hearsay alone. There is no other evidence of notice 
to the employer or of a lack of a safety program at Eaton, 
for that matter other than hearsay evidence. There must be 
a "residuum of evidence, legal and competent in a Court of law, 
to support a claim before an award can be made, and the finding 
cannot be based wholly upon hearsay evidence". Ogden Iron Works 
v. Industrial Commission, 102 U. 492, at 498, 132 P2d 276 (1942). 
See also Garfield Smelting Co. v. Industrial Commission, 53 U. 
133, 178 P. 57. 
All of the evidence on those two points that Plaintiff 
would introduce was and is hearsay. In fact, all of the legally 
competent evidence on those two issues directly contradicts 
any indication of prior notice to the employer of a hazard and 
the lack of a safety program. (See the summaries of the witnesses1 
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testimony hereinabove) 
Even taking all of the evidence into consideration, 
both hearsay and competent evidence, the record firmly and 
without doubt supports the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge that: "On this state of the record it is concluded that 
claimant has not established a willful failure of his employer 
to comply with the law or a lawful order of the Commission..." 
(R. 210-211) 
It is further obvious that there is nothing in the 
record that any act or omission, if any, on the part of Defen-
dant gave rise to "...the idea of premeditation, obstinancy, 
and intentional wrong doing" or that such acts or omissions, 
if any, included "...the element of intractableness, the head-
strong disposition to act by the rule of contradiction" or 
that said acts or omissions, if any, carried "...the idea of 
deliberation". Park Utah Mining/ supra. 
The burden is upon the Plaintiff in this appeal to 
show that the Industrial Commission was capricious and arbitrary 
in its denial of Plaintiff's application. That burden is 
succinctly explained in Long v. Western States Refining Company 
et al, 14 Utah 2d 398, 384 P2d, 1015 (Utah 1963) at 384 P2d 1016: 
"We do not question the principle advocated that 
the Commission should resolve doubts in favor of 
coverage of the employee to effectuate the purposes 
of the act by providing compensation for injuries 
suffered in employment; nor that had the Commission 
been disposed to so find, there is a basis in the 
evidence upon which it could have determined that 
-9-
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Mr. Long suffered an accidental injury in the course 
of his employment which resulted in his death. Never-
theless , our statute, Sec. 35-1-85, U.C.A. 195 3, grants 
the Commission the prerogative of finding the facts. 
When it has denied the application for compensation 
and a reversal is sought, the applicant, as the moving 
party, has the burden of showing that the evidence is 
such that a finding in her favor is the only reasonable 
finding that could be made, so that the Commission's 
refusal to so find was capricious and arbitrary. Reflec-
tion upon the evidence recited above will show clearly 
that this is not the situation here, and that there is ample 
justification therein for the Commission's refusal to believe 
that there was an industrial accident." (Emphasis added) 
The case at bar differs from the above only in that 
there is no basis in the evidence to support Plaintiff's claim 
of "willfulness" and therefore, the only reasonable position the 
Industrial Commission could have taken was a denial. 
ARGUMENT 
;,, POINT II 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED ACCESS TO THE RECORD IN 
PREPARATION OF HIS MOTION FOR REVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGE'S DENIAL OF HIS APPLICATION. 
In Point II of his brief Plaintiff asserts that he 
was not given the 20 days he requested to review the record and 
transcript of the hearing. (Appellant's brief at pages 6-7) 
That simply is not true. His request was made December 12, 
1975. (R. 215) The Denial of Claimant's Petition For Review 
was not entered until January 27, 1976. (R. 217) Forty-six 
days had passed during which it appears no attempt was made 
by Plaintiff to request the reporter to prepare a transcript. 
-10-
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The Industrial Commission file, being a public record was 
open to Plaintiff any time during that period. It is not 
the duty of Defendant to supply a transcript of the hearing 
to Plaintiff, nor is it the duty of the Commission or the 
reporter to supply the transcript to Plaintiff when he doesn't 
take the necessary step to order it. 
Further, even if this proved to be error on the part 
of the Industrial Commission it would create no difference in 
the state of the record. Plaintiff still would not have been 
able to support his claim for a 15% increase in his benefits. 
It would be at most harmless error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DENIED A FULL AND FAIR HEARING. 
At Page 7 in Plaintiff's brief is the accusation 
that the Administrative Law Judge "failed and refused to 
schedule the continued hearing" during which time a crucial 
witness, Sam Mulliner, left the jurisdiction and his testimony 
was therefore lost. A review of the record will show the 
falacy of this contention. 
The hearing on this matter was originally scheduled 
for September 5, 1974, but pursuant to a telephone call of 
Plaintiff's counsel, the matter was actually heard August 7, 
1974. (R. 24-25) 
-11-
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In the original notice, both Defendant and Plaintiff 
were advised: 
"Cases must be prepared before the hearing. All 
necessary witnesses, ... must be ready at the hearing..." 
"Single hearings are favored, and the policy of 
the Commission is against continuances, changes, 
or further hearings." (R. 24) 
Plaintiff was aware of these policies and certainly 
availed himself of the subpoena power. No less than nine 
subpoenas were served at the behest of Plaintiff. (R. 29-45) 
Sam Mulliner was not among those subpoened though his report 
was of public record and his identity easily discernible. 
However, in order to be more than fair, the Administrative 
Law Judge did grant a continuance so that Plaintiff could secure 
Mr. Mulliner as a witness. 
On October 29, 1974, counsel for Plaintiff sent a letter 
to the Administrative Law Judge in which he included a letter 
from Mr. Sam Mulliner dated October 20, 19 74, in which Mr. Mulliner 
refers to a letter of inquiry from counsel for Plaintiff of 
October 11, 1974. (R. 162-166) Mr. Mulliner's letter was admitted 
into evidence and considered. 
Also in the letter of Plaintiff's counsel of October 29, 
1974, Plaintiff rested his case: 
"With the inclusion of this report, the employee, 
Willie M. Salas, will rest his case with all the 
evidence that is in the record at the present time." 
(R. 16 3) 
-12-
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No recitation of law is necessary in light of these 
facts. There is no evidence that Plaintiff was denied a Full 
and Fair Hearing. There is no indication that Mr. Mulliner was 
within the jurisdiction of the Commission at the time of the 
original hearing and thereafter. No indication was ever given 
to the Administrative Law Judge that he was about to leave the 
jurisdiction so that a continued hearing could be scheduled more 
rapidly. Two and one half months is not unusual nor an inordinant 
length of time to wait a scheduling of the continued hearing. 
That hearing certainly had to take its place in the regular turn 
of scheduling barring unusual circumstances which were never 
presented to the Administrative Law Judge. While he was in the 
jurisdiction, Mr. Mulliner1s deposition could have been taken 
to preserve his testimony, but no effort was made in that direction. 
Again, it is not the responsibility of either Defendants or the 
Commission to procure and produce witnesses and evidence for 
Plaintiff. Most importantly, Plaintiff rested his case on 
October 29, 1974. (R. 163) 
One final point, if Mr. Mullinerfs oral testimony 
comported with his official report and his letter, there would 
still be no evidence to support the claim of "willfulness". 
(See Argument Point I) 
Plaintiff was indeed given a Full and Fair Hearing. 
He had every opportunity to present his entire claim. 
-13-
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CONCLUSION 
The claimant has failed to present evidence which 
could support his claim that Defendant, Eaton Metals, willfully 
failed to comply with the law or any lawful order of the 
Industrial Commission. The Plaintiff was not denied due process 
of law and did receive a full and fair hearing. Therefore, the 
order of the Industrial Commission of Utah denying a 15% increase 
in the benefits to Plaintiff should be affirmed. 
DATED this 19th day of November, 1976. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
IES R. BLACK 
for Defendant 
ispondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Respondents Brief to Michael Shepard, 216 East Fifth South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on this 22nd day of November 1976. 
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